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Jessica Wade 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the recent efforts of the Chinese government to 
facilitate rural development. It reviews the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP)’s previous emphasis on urban-based growth, the 
history behind the shift towards rural development, and the 
attempts by President Hu Jintao to move from extensive urban 
development towards sustainable rural development. It asserts, 
first, that much of China’s urban-based development was 
intentionally encouraged by the government, and second, that the 
CCP is now deliberately moving its investment and focus to 
rural-based growth. The paper justifies these findings through an 
exploration of the previous and current economic policies and 
propaganda of the CCP. This study also explores the logic behind 
the policy changes and the implications of the new rural 
development policies, combining the primary and secondary 
resources with fieldwork undertaken in Sichuan province. The 
findings help us better understand how the previous government 
policies have shaped China’s dualistic development and how 
China’s economic landscape may be drastically transformed within 
the decade.  
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China’s Good Earth: 
From Urbanization to Rural Development  
under Hu Jintao’s Administration 
 
Jessica Wade 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Since the inauguration of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen 
Jiabao in March 2003, rural development has quickly snaked its 
way to the top of the Chinese government’s agenda. By March 
2005 Premier Wen had pledged that agriculture, farmers and the 
rural areas would constitute “top priority of all [the] work” of 
central government. (The People’s Daily Online, 10 March 2005) The 
Number One Documents of both 2004 and 2005 also made rural 
welfare a top priority for the government. (Lu 2005: 392) Hu and 
Wen’s slogan of “Establishing the New Socialist Countryside” 
(Jianshe shehui zhuyi xin nongcun), unveiled in 2005, clarifies rural 
development as the leading goal for China in the twentieth-first 
century. This slogan represents a deliberate effort to reverse 
urbanization as both a phenomenon and an unarticulated 
development strategy of the previous administrations. Chen 
Xiwen, deputy director of the Office of Central Financial Work 
Leading Group, succinctly captured the logic of this reversal in 
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policy: “Are we to continue relying on the rural masses for 
industrialization and urbanization? …The urban and industrial 
economy will now work to drive the countryside forward.” 
(Bloomberg.com, 3 March 2006) 
  
Hu and Wen have numerous reasons for reversing the 
previous policy of urbanization. First, urbanization has become a 
major social, political, and economic concern. Second, economic 
growth has been so chaotic that the government began trying to 
curb its growth in 2006. An emphasis on rural development can be 
seen as part of this effort to redirect investment and growth to the 
poorer regions. Third, environmental concerns make the current 
development pattern unsustainable and necessitate new strategies. 
Fourth, international media and Chinese intellectuals have called 
for the government to balance development; these criticisms 
threaten Hu’s legitimacy as China’s new leader. Fifth, and perhaps 
most importantly, the urban-rural gap has become so noticeable 
that it has sparked massive protests over the last few years. 
Protests in 2005 reached an official count of 87,000, with an 
increase of 10,000 over 2004. (Bloomberg.com, 3 March 2006) Chen 
Guidi and Wu Chuntao’s controversial work, Zhongguo nongmin 
diaocha (A Survey of Chinese Peasants), published in 2003, portrayed 
the sufferings of Chinese farmers during a time of plenty, igniting 
more outrage across the country. In response to the growing 
criticism, the government has been increasing its investment in the 
rural areas and agricultural sector.  
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 This study combines the Chinese official publications on 
rural development with fieldwork materials, which were collected 
in Sichuan Province in July 2006. The field work was undertaken 
through the assistance of Heifer Project International China (Guoji 
Xiaomuniu Xiangmu). During the fieldwork, I interviewed Chinese 
farmers and local officials who participated in Heifer’s livestock-
raising programs. The interviews were conducted in two counties. 
Nanbu County, five hours’ drive northeast of Chengdu, is one of 
China’s designated poor counties; the Heifer programs there 
involve rabbit and pig raising projects. Dayi County, an hour’s 
drive west of Chengdu, implements Heifer’s rabbit raising projects. 
Interviews focused on the planning, monitoring, and evaluation 
needs of Heifer Project International China. Although the 
experience in these two counties only represent a small fraction of 
the overall picture, the knowledge and insights gained from 
fieldwork highlight the complexities of rural development at the 
grassroots level.  
 
This paper first examines the history of urbanization in 
China, the role of urbanization in Chinese development, and the 
government’s role in encouraging urbanization. In particular, it 
discusses the current efforts of the Chinese Communist Party to 
shift from urbanization to sustainable rural development. It draws 
on the interviews conducted in the countryside in July 2006 to 
evaluate the government’s policies of rural development, its 
implementation, and the reactions of Chinese farmers. This study 
then addresses the question of whether the new emphasis on rural 
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development represents a re-orientation of the Communist 
government policy of modernization. It concludes by analyzing 
the implications of the rural development strategies in twentieth-
first-century China.  
 
 
The Height of Urbanization Strategy 
Urbanization in China differs from urbanization in the developed 
and developing world. Its main features include the intentional 
urbanization of small towns rather than major cities, the growth of 
floating migration rather than permanent urban migration, the 
constraints on rural-to-urban migration imposed by the hukou 
(household) registration system, and the rapid growth of urban 
development at the expense of rural welfare.   
  
The Chinese term of urbanization, chengshihua or dushihua, 
refers to an increasing concentration of the national population in 
cities and towns. (Demography Dictionary 1986: 367) As Shi Yilong 
further points out, “[Urbanization] refers to the process of the 
agricultural population becoming a non-agricultural population as 
it concentrates in the cities.” (Shi 1997: 123) Gregory Eliyu Guldin 
notes that the State Statistical Bureau recorded an increase in the 
urban population from 20.8% in 1982 to 36.6% in 1988, and then to 
49.6% by the end of 1988. (State Statistical Bureau 1989: 87, in 
Guldin 1992: 3) Other official figures cite the urban population rate 
as increasing from 19.39% in 1980 to 37.66% in 2001. (China 
Statistical Yearbook 2002: 21, in Chen 2004: 1) These conflicting 
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figures are affected by the different definitions of a township and 
by the presence of agricultural and floating migrant populations 
living within these urban areas. Nonetheless they exemplify the 
rapid growth of urbanization.  
   
The phenomena of Chinese urbanization cannot be explained 
simply through a growth of city populations but is further 
distinguished in several specific ways. First, much of the 
“urbanization” taking place occurs as rural people move within 
their counties to small towns such as the county seat, rather than 
small or major cities. (See Figure 1) This pattern directly 
contradicts the conventional patterns of urbanization in other 
developing countries, where rural populations tend to migrate to 
the capital or to a megalopolis such as Lagos and Mexico City. 
(ISTED 2005: 7) This development directly stems from the state’s 
policies. In the new economic reform policies released in 
December 1978 and October 1984, the Chinese government created 
an urban distribution policy that promoted small towns and rural 
industrialization as a means to achieve its development goals. 
“The distribution policy called for limited development in all large 
metropolitan areas, the selective development of only a few 
medium-sized cities, more development in small cities, but most 
development in rural towns and villages. Rural-urbanization or 
‘urbanizing the countryside’ continue[d] as slogans for urban 
development.” (Chang et al 1990: 140) This policy has been 
credited with preventing even more chaotic migration to major 
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cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, which have been 
overpopulated for centuries.  
  
Second, Chinese urbanization is overwhelmingly 
characterized by the movement of rural population to towns and 
cities for a season or for a few years before returning home, thus 
never severing the social and economic ties with their home village. 
Many of these temporary migrants form regional and kinship-
based communities in the city, extending the reach of their village 
into the city, and increasing the influence of the city back in the 
countryside. Figure 2 shows the growth of the inter-county 
“floating population” (liudong renkou) since 1982. The period from 
1995 to 2000 saw the growth of a floating population almost 3 
times higher than the created permanent migrant populations, at 
59 million versus 20 million. (Liang et al 2004: 473) The size of this 
floating population accounted for 6 per cent of the country’s total 
population in 2000. (ibid) China’s floating population and its 
extensive linkages between rural and urban areas have become an 
integral part of the contemporary Chinese social landscape. 
  
Third, Shi Yilong (1997) draws attention to a major tension in 
China’s urbanization: the natural “pull” of cities (due to more 
abundant employment opportunities) and the “push” of rural 
areas (through labour surpluses) cause a greater flow to the cities 
than what can be accommodated by the Chinese urban planning 
policies and household registration system. The government has in 
many ways prevented a great deal of urbanization through the 
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hukou restrictions, which prohibit those who leave their hometown 
without permission from receiving any benefits granted to 
“legitimate” urban residents. If the government did not have the 
hukou system in place, rural-urban migration would arguably be 
much greater than it is today. However, the restricted level of 
urbanization is nonetheless having a vast impact on the economy, 
increasing growth while leading to inequality and rural discontent. 
A corollary effect of the hukou policy is that rural areas are under 
great pressure to provide new non-agricultural work opportunities 
to employ relatively immobile surplus labour and to prevent this 
population from moving to the cities illegally. The inadequacy of 
the urban areas to absorb migrants and the rigid settlement system 
in place actually make urbanization all the more apparent, despite 
their statistically lower levels relative to other countries. 
  
Indeed, China’s rate of urbanization is well below average. 
“The urban population as a percentage of the total population on 
average is 78 for high income OECD countries but is only 31 for 
low income countries.” (World Bank 2001, in Chang 2004: 168) 
While figures on China’s urban population vary from 32% to 49%, 
it is still far below the World Bank’s calculation of an 
industrialized nation’s average urban population. Gene H. Chang 
states that “China lags behind the world standard in urbanization, 
even during its rapid economic growth period under 
reform. …Urgent attention and effective policies are needed to 
accelerate urbanization.” (Chang 2004: 167) This claim rests on the 
ability of urban populations to drive industrialization and, thus, 
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development. The claim takes theoretical models such as the Lewis 
dual-sector model and Kuznets Curve theories as universal models 
for development.  
  
The appeals for China to improve its cities to absorb more 
rural migrants and to dismantle the hukou system both have merit. 
However, Chang’s petition for China to increase urbanization in 
order to develop more rapidly confuses causality with correlation; 
“development” as an end result cannot necessarily be achieved 
through further urbanization, which would only increase the 
uneven development and inefficiencies as we see today. 
Furthermore, the Western capitalistic model of industrialization 
simply cannot withstand the extremely complicated realities faced 
by the Chinese government. Claiming that the state should 
actively promote urbanization overlooks many problems including 
the social tension created by such rapid urbanization, the economic 
inefficiencies of drastically uneven development, the 
environmental disasters, and the logical inadequacy of the Kuznets 
model, which claims that once all surplus labour is absorbed, 
national income equality will increase. (Lu 2004) “The Kuznets 
Curve…predicts that [inequality] should decline as more people 
move out of agriculture into the industrial sector. But since every 
seventh person on this planet works in Chinese agriculture, there 
are a lot of people left to move.” (Piech 2004) Simply put, the 
direction of Chinese development and urbanization must not rely 
too completely on global comparative studies of urbanization, but 
rather on Chinese realities. 
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 The Chinese pattern of urbanization is perhaps most 
fundamentally distinguished by the greater government 
investment and more rapidly increasing wage in the cities as 
compared to rural areas. Mao and his successors have invested 
tremendously in industrialization (which requires cheap workers), 
urban infrastructure (to facilitate industrial development and 
trade), and urban housing and food distribution. The wage gap in 
urban and rural areas represents an increasingly problematic and 
contentious issue in China. According to Gu Hongbin, “The share 
of the rural population in total consumption has fallen from 
around 60% in the early 1980s to just 42% in 2001, while the share 
of the rural population in China’s total population still stands at 
65%.” (Gu Hongbin 2002, in Nolan 2004: 13) Gerhard K. Heilig 
argues that China’s Gini index (its measure of inequality) stands at 
0.447, which is highly uneven; the fact this level of inequality has 
essentially developed only since 1978 makes the contrast even 
more staggering. (See Figure 3) (Heilig 2006: 147) The “wage” gap 
is not merely about purchasing power and wages, however: 
“Urban residents earn about 3.22 times as much as their rural 
counterparts, according to official figures. But experts estimate that 
if the non-salary benefits of urban residents are taken into 
consideration, the gap could be up to six times.” (The China Daily, 
13 June 2006) Essentially, almost all of China’s economic 
development in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries 
has taken place in the cities. 
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In the final analysis, three parallel processes of Chinese 
“urbanization” can be discerned: first, demographically, more 
rural people are moving out of the countryside and urban 
populations are increasing relative to rural populations. Second, 
sociologically, rural populations seem to be acquiring more urban 
ways of life through increased integration with cities and an 
increasing exposure to non-agricultural employment opportunities. 
Third, and most importantly for this analysis, “urbanization” 
describes the increasing prosperity and importance of urban areas 
in terms of their development. All these processes result from the 
previous government policies. Regarding uncontrolled causes of 
urbanization, China, like any other developing nation, has 
endured the systemic problems of comparatively poor rural access 
to healthcare, education, and perhaps most importantly, profit-
making. Seasonal setbacks such as flood and drought intensified 
rural vulnerability. Due to centuries of overpopulation, China has 
also had a long-established rural labour surplus, making it 
unnecessary and illogical for all the farmers to remain in the 
countryside. Thus there has always been a trend for migration to 
the cities. The Communist authorities have greatly slowed down 
this process of rural-to-urban migration by introducing the 
household registration system. Chan Kam Wing points out that 
this restriction was introduced and maintained because the 
government prioritized industrial growth over consumption, and 
therefore was unwilling to spend a great deal of money on 
urbanization costs such as universal housing and welfare for the 
growing industrial labour force. (Chan 1992: 60) 
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Urban Development as Urbanization  
Ironically, by 2003 the Communist Party was both at its height of 
urbanization strategies while preventing urbanization more than 
any Chinese administration or imperial dynasty. This 
contradiction is due to greater urban investment at the expense of 
rural welfare. The increasing prosperity of the cities creates an 
even greater sense of urbanization. Because there is so much 
improvement in urban areas, the desire of rural people to migrate 
is greater; this has further enforced the need for the household 
registration system as a means of social control and the lack of 
assistance for the so-called “illegal” migrants in order to 
discourage their migration. Consequently, the migrants end up 
living in a chaotic condition with no access to education, 
healthcare, decent wages, housing, pensions and unemployment 
benefits.  
  
The government has, since the Han period (206 BC—AD 220), 
built up its cities not only as trading centres but also as 
administrative powers. Since 1949 in particular, the Communist 
state has sought to rapidly industrialize in order to become a 
world superpower. (Pannell 1992: 12, 24) The government has also 
actively invested and sought private investment for trade, 
including ports and factories, as well as higher-priced shopping 
and housing developments in cities. Despite the rhetoric of “de-
urbanism” and “anti-urbanism” designed to close the gap between 
the rural and urban sectors, the most efficient industrialization 
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during economic reform took place in urban areas. (Kwok 1992: 67, 
citing Kirkby 1985:1-18) 
  
Thus urbanization as a process of development, in which 
urban areas are being actively developed by the Chinese 
government to the detriment of rural populations, has been 
enforced by a number of policies. “Yang (1999) attributed the rise 
in urban-rural disparity after 1985 to what he called ‘urban-biased 
policy mix’, including increased urban subsidies, investments, and 
banking credits, which have affected higher inflationary taxes on 
rural earnings.” (Lu 2004: 256) Meanwhile, D. G. Johnson points to 
three major policy areas that have affected rural incomes: 
restrictions on rural to urban migration, the inaccessibility of 
education in rural areas, and the urban-biased allocation of 
investment and credit. (Johnson 2000) Several specific policies, 
which have benefited urban workers and harmed rural-born 
citizens, are outlined here.  
  
First, urban residents receive far better social welfare than 
rural residents. Urban benefits not only include access to 
healthcare and education; “universal work participation and 
residence were the key social inclusion and welfare entitlement 
factors.” Meanwhile, “the state has never been directly involved in 
rural welfare affairs carried out by the communes and brigades 
and only intervened in residual relief work.” (Hebel 2004: 224) The 
growing welfare gap is not simply a result of an improvement in 
urban welfare; rural welfare has in many cases degenerated. “It is 
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widely agreed that the relatively equal access to healthcare that 
existed before the reform has been eroded by decentralization and 
deregulation and inequality increased at the regional and 
household levels.” (Bloom and Wilkes 1997, in Hebel 2004: 227) 
Ironically, “the rapid economic development brought by free-
market reforms has … brought a collapse in the country's health 
care system. Under-funded hospitals now refuse treatment to the 
poor, and medical professionals leave impoverished rural areas.” 
(Ramirez, 1 May 2006) Evidently, the benefits accruing to urban 
residents are not only denied to rural workers nationally; within 
cities urban workers do not have to share their full benefits with 
non-legitimate residents. Were benefits shared among all residents, 
city resources would be stretched much further, and the overall 
prosperity of the legitimate residents would be lower.  
  
Second, these unrecognized rural workers are providing the 
cheap labour essential for rapid industrialization. “According to 
official statistics, there are now 130 million (equivalent to one-half 
the American population) migrant workers in Chinese cities. This 
means that China has more migrant than urban workers, and that 
they constitute the main Chinese industrial workforce.” (China 
Today, April 2004) A survey conducted by China’s labour and 
social security department showed that within 2,600 enterprises in 
26 Chinese cities, including Beijing, Tianjin and Shenzhen, migrant 
workers earn an average wage of 660 yuan per month. This amount 
is about 300 yuan lower than the average wage earned by urban 
industrial workers. (ibid) As the main component of the urban 
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work force, the extreme wage discrimination against migrant 
workers ensures fast industrial growth at the expense of these 
workers. 
  
Third, cheap urban food comes at a severe burden to farmers 
in the countryside. “State-imposed price controls and a policy 
favouring industrial goods kept the prices of rural produce 
artificially low, forcing farmers to subsidize urban living 
standards.” (Zweig 1997: 186) Much tax in rural areas has 
historically been paid with grain. During the most drastic level of 
state procurement, throughout the Great Leap Forward, grain 
taxes took crucial food from the rural population and fed both the 
urban population and the military, thus contributing to the tragic 
poverty and famines of the era. (ibid) While the grain tax has 
largely diminished, controlled prices have continued in some form 
until today, with some prices still controlled but at close to market 
value. When prices were at their lower levels, farmers have been 
prevented from making any profit and raising themselves above 
the subsistence level. Meanwhile, with rising urban wages and 
maintained low food prices, inaccessible urban work was 
becoming more profitable. Controlled low food prices directly kept 
rural areas from developing as quickly as urban areas.  
  
Fourth, and perhaps most galling to rural workers in recent 
times, the historical agricultural taxes, based on size of family and 
size of holdings, was collected from subsistence workers and used 
to fund urban projects and, indirectly, urban wage workers. This 
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agricultural tax signified that the rural populations were funding 
the government’s urban strategies of development. As the 
economy grew, the proceeds from the agricultural tax, as a portion 
of the state’s fiscal revenue, dwindled (Lu 2003); however, at the 
household level the taxes remained a serious constraint on 
incomes, and a constant reminder of the rural workers’ burden 
under the state.  
 
 
Examining the New Emphasis on Rural Development  
One of Deng Xiaoping’s strategies was to encourage “natural 
development.” Essentially, the naturally advantaged areas such as 
the coastal, accessible, and fertile regions should be allowed to 
develop quickly rather than adhering to the Maoist model of 
centralized planning. (The China Daily, 13 August 2004) A hallmark 
of this strategy was the creation of open economic zones along the 
coast. This strategy was hugely successful for several years, but 
since the 1990s, there have been growing criticisms of the huge 
economic disparity between urban and rural populations. Again, 
this disparity is problematic both because the rural populations 
cannot legitimately move to the cities, and because the rapid 
growth of urban economy is achieved at the expense of the 
wellbeing of rural areas.   
  
The immediate benefits of the 1978 market reforms lifted up 
to 200 million people out of poverty (White Paper PDR I 2005) and 
directly benefited rural workers; but by 1993, the rate of 
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improvement in poverty reduction had slowed down greatly. 
(Merkle 2004: 160) The initial success of the Township Village 
Enterprises diminished, and rural unemployment and 
underemployment increased, affecting migration patterns. As 
Peter Nolan argues, “The massive growth of rural 
underemployment deeply affects the character of development in 
the non-farm sector. It provides intensive incentives for rural-
urban migration, and great downward pressure on non-farm 
wages in unskilled and low-skilled occupations. By 2002, there 
were around 150 million rural residents who worked in the urban 
areas without permanent urban residence qualifications.” (Nolan 
2004: 13) By the mid-90s, rural residents could choose to embrace a 
subsistence livelihood in the countryside or to migrate to the cities 
for guaranteed low wages and a risky but relatively better quality 
of life. 
  
When the dust of the reform era had settled, the drastic 
differences between urban and rural populations spelled trouble 
for the nation. As early as 1993 the government was exploring 
ways of tackling the rural poverty problem. In 1994 the 
government released its National 8-7 Poverty Reduction Plan, with 
“8” signifying the remaining 80 million rural poor and “7” 
denoting the time span of the project. The three main goals of the 
project were listed as follows: 
“Socialism will abolish poverty. In order to solve the rural 
poverty problem further, narrow the gap between eastern 
and western parts of the country, and attain the goal of 
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common prosperity, the State Council decided to 
concentrate manpower, material and financial resources, 
and to mobilize forces from all walks of life between 1994 
and 2000 in an effort to solve the subsistence problem of 80 
million needy people in rural areas throughout the country 
within 7 years. This is a daunting battle against a difficult 
problem.” (GFKLXB, 1996: 1)1 (Merkle 2004: 161)  
 
Then Vice-Premier Wen Jiabao soon introduced a trial 
resettlement policy. In a speech at the Working Conference on 
Fighting Poverty, which took place in early June 1999 in Beijing, 
Wen stated that there were two types of impoverished people left 
in the countryside: “first, disabled and people in need of social 
protection (this means people who are dependent on family 
support and social welfare) and second, those people who live in 
areas with an extremely adverse natural environment, especially in 
remote mountainous areas and some of the national minority 
regions, where lack of basic productive and living conditions is 
common. Some of the people living there have to be moved out 
and resettled.” (The People’s Daily, 22 July 1999: 2-3, in Merkle 2004: 
162) Such quasi-voluntary resettlement schemes, which took place 
primarily in the western provinces of China, did not become the 
major poverty reduction strategy of the government. 
  
The most significant measure introduced by 1986 was 
regional targeting. This method designated 592 counties, where 
the average rural net income was under 500 Renminbi (RMB) per 
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capita annually, as poverty stricken. “This approach to poverty 
reduction—spatially organized to targeted localities—was new in 
China’s history and is used both in carrying out public work 
programs and in implementing credit programs. Prior to that time, 
the main approach was to provide relief goods and grants to 
disaster-stricken people through the assistance system.” (Merkle 
2004: 167) These regional funding schemes helped provinces and 
counties introduce specific projects. In Ningxia province, for 
instance, the 336 million RMB that it received from the fund 
between 1983 and 1992 helped establish 304 local development 
projects. (168) In general, most of the government’s anti-poverty 
funding went directly to these designated poor counties. (169) 
  
These programs and strategies, while significant, can be seen 
in the context of Jiang Zemin’s emphasis on developing the 
western part of China and evening regional disparities. The focus 
of President Hu, however, is primarily concerned with rural 
development itself. The strategies of the 1980s and 1990s 
addressed dire poverty (“food and clothing” poverty) in specific 
areas; the new strategies represent a broader understanding of 
rural poverty not as an isolated problem of remote or adverse 
regions, but as a nationwide problem affecting all aspects of 
society. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have backed up this 
comprehensive rural development program with major 
propaganda and funding. They have tried to slow down urban 
growth in terms of population growth and investment in public 
and private facilities. (The New York Times, 16 August 2006) 
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 One explanation for this policy change is that the former 
model of industrialization has been exhausted, and the 
government recognizes the need to redirect growth to the poorer 
regions. On the one hand, the potential for agriculture to expand is 
severely limited, due to the shortage of cultivable land and falling 
prices. On the other hand, the ability of state-owned or collective 
enterprises to absorb any more of the rural unskilled labour is also 
limited. (Cheng 2004: 133) Thus the state must improve non-
agricultural employment opportunities, both through increasing 
access to skills and to these jobs, and it must do everything in its 
power to protect agriculture and those employed in it to prevent 
an employment meltdown.  
  
Questions of the sustainability, intensity, and sincerity of this 
new focus have inevitably arisen. The Communist Party seems to 
be committed financially to rural development, but for how long 
and at what sacrifice remains to be seen. For now the government 
will be using many of its land-use fees to support rural investment:  
“In recent years, local governments have made a lot of money 
charging industry developers land-use fees, but that revenue has 
been used mostly for urban construction, and rural areas have 
seldom benefited…[now] China will enhance the tax revenue from 
land lease or land-use fees and invest it in agriculture and the 
countryside.” (Gov.cn, 24 February 2006) The government gives 
the impression that it is sincerely committed to tackling rural 
poverty and balancing national development. Hu Jintao and Wen 
Jiabao have repeatedly emphasized their wishes to improve rural 
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livelihoods, and they have backed up their words with action. 
They openly admit that there are other reasons behind the new 
approach: beyond the obvious desire to ease farmers’ burdens, 
they are also hoping to avoid the outbreak of collective violence by 
improving farmers’ conditions and their perception of the 
government. The state has been less forthcoming about whether 
this focus on rural development aims to reduce urban migration. 
The government could be trying to improve rural areas so that 
they will not be forced to abolish the hukou restrictions, a system 
designed to prevent full-fledged urban migration. Conversely, 
perhaps the government would like to lift the hukou, but it wants 
to make sure that the subsequent increase in urban migration will 
not be too overwhelming.  
 
One of the most important changes in rural policy has been 
the elimination of agricultural taxes on farmers in 2006. These 
taxes, based on family size and land holdings, had existed in some 
form for almost three millennia: “Since the beginning of recorded 
history, all Chinese dynasties from the primeval Shang to the 
Communists have relied on often crushing taxes levied on the 
peasantry.” (MacNamara, November 2005) As the Chinese finance 
minister Jin Renqing publicly announced: “We will completely 
rescind the agricultural tax throughout the country, throwing it 
into the ‘dustbin of history’ after a history of 2,600 years in China.” 
Jin expected the reform of rural taxes and fees to reduce the 
financial burden of 800 million rural residents by about $15.63 
billion a year. (The Financial Times, 8 March 2006) 
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 Wen Jiabao originally announced the proposal to phase out 
the agricultural tax during the 2004 National People’s Congress 
Session, with the plan to eliminate the tax within 5 years. In 2005 
he announced at the 10th National People’s Congress that the 
government was accelerating the tax reduction process: 
“Agricultural tax will be exempted throughout the country next 
year, which means what had been targeted for five years will be 
achieved in just three years.” (The China Daily, 6 March 2005) 
Evidence shows that the agricultural tax probably constituted 25% 
of the peasant’s tax burden, with the rest of the burden comprising 
local taxes, “contributions” (tiliu) and “apportionments” (tongchou). 
(Li 2004: 48-52) Wen’s tax reform addresses these local taxes as 
well: “Over 70 billion yuan in the form of ‘three deductions’ (for 
public reserve funds, public welfare funds and management fees) 
and ‘five charges’ (charges for rural education, family planning, 
militia training, rural road construction and subsidies to entitled 
groups) would also be eliminated.” (The Financial Times, 8 March 
2006) By eliminating the taxes for all rural residents nationwide, 
the government has sent a clear message that it is taking a 
comprehensive, rather than targeted, approach to rural 
development. Furthermore, the message is no longer simply about 
food and clothing, but about levelling the urban-rural disparity.  
  
The portion of the agriculture tax as a share in China’s total 
fiscal budget was only 1.7% by 2003. (Lu 2003: 392) However, some 
analysts worry that the tax elimination will hurt those local 
governments heavily dependent on tax revenue to function. The 
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elimination of the agricultural tax and similar “contributions” does 
not spell the abolition of all taxes for farmers: “Rural residents will 
gradually be moved to other tax categories similar to their urban 
counterparts.” (The China Daily, 26 December 2005, quoting Yang 
Jingyu, chairman of NPC Law Committee) In other words, the 
local governments are not fully bereft of tax revenue, but have lost 
a major portion of their previous tax revenue which must be 
compensated by the government: “Thus, elimination of the 
agriculture tax had to be tied to the institution of a centrally 
coordinated revenue sharing scheme and to shifts in responsibility 
for public service provision to higher levels of government. 
Otherwise, there would be no hope of restraining taxation and fees 
at the local level.” (Lu 2003: 392) Wen Jiabao was aware of this 
problem and had taken steps to address this financial loss: 
“Revenue decreases in local budgets incurred as a result of taxes 
reduced or exempted on agriculture and livestock will be offset 
principally by transfer payments from the central government.” 
(The China Daily, 6 March 2005) The government has promised 
over 103 billion RMB annually to both ensure normal operation of 
township governments and to meet the goal of rural compulsory 
education. (The Financial Times, 8 March 2006) 
  
Besides the elimination of agricultural tax, the government 
was keen to improve the basic infrastructure for the rural 
population. In the 11th Five Year Plan the government allocated 
100 billion RMB (US$12.3 billion) for road construction in the 
countryside. (Gov.cn, 24 February 2006) Local governments are 
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thus able to grant subsidies for village infrastructure. Many 
villages which cite poor roads as their major obstacle to 
development pursue subsidies in building transportation 
infrastructure. In Zhangjiamiao Village in Pingqiao Township, 
Nanbu County, for example, the residents decided that the 
community’s greatest need would be a central road from the 
highway into the village. The village group, aided by the Animal 
Husbandry Bureau and Heifer International, agreed that each 
family would invest 100 yuan plus labour, and solicit the 
remainder of necessary funds from the county government. The 
county government agreed to the request and provided the rest of 
the money on the condition that the villagers invest financially and 
contribute their labour to the construction of the road. (Xu 
Quanjian, interviewed by the author, 9 July 2006) In Dayi County’s 
Qunming Village, which lies across the river from the main 
highway, the residents found that the dirt path between the river 
and the village isolated the villagers from the market and proved a 
danger to the residents. They petitioned for government assistance 
to build a concrete path from the river to the village, and 
throughout the village as well. The county government granted 
the village 20 tons of cement, with the understanding that each 
family would invest money and contribute labour to the 
construction of the concrete paths. (Zhang Mingxia, interviewed 
by the author, 13 July 2006) The villagers now hope to secure 
funding for building a bridge across the water in order to increase 
access to the main road. (See Picture 1) 
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The government has also in the last few years increased its 
subsidies to farmers for other infrastructure needs. For example, 
the government is increasingly subsidizing bio-gas tanks for 
farmers raising livestock. These tanks, which convert animal 
manure into gas which may be used for cooking, have multiple 
benefits for its owners: the use of gas eliminates the need for 
firewood, sparing both the labour and the environmental 
consequences of chopping down trees and branches; the remaining 
solid residue in the tank is purified of bacteria and much cleaner 
(and less odorous) for spreading on the fields and using in 
fisheries. The gas may cook all meals in summer and one or two 
meals a day in winter; when Zhang Chengbi showed us her bio-
gas system, she bragged, “And best of all [the gas for cooking] is 
completely free. In the city you’d have to pay for gas!” (Zhang 
Chengbi, interviewed by the author, 7 July 2006) The subsidies for 
bio-gas tanks, which can be as much as 1000 yuan for a 1400 yuan 
tank, are awarded through a county’s Energy Resource Office; 
village heads or groups (such as livestock bureaus or non-
governmental organizations) who apply to this office on behalf of 
the villages are put on a waiting list to receive the household 
subsidies and the technical construction assistance. 
   
  In Pingqiao Township of Nanbu County, the Nanbu County 
Animal Husbandry Bureau was able to secure from the County 
Magistrate a subsidy of 15 yuan per square meter for new pig barn 
construction. (The average cost for building a standardized pig 
barn is 125 yuan/m2.) This standardized construction was 
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necessary for ensuring hygiene and efficiency, and the subsidy 
encouraged pig farmers to invest in building a new barn. In 2006 
the government increased its subsidy to 50 yuan/m2, which 
resulted in more investment from the Pingqiao farmers. (Long 
Baojun, interviewed by the author, 8 July 2006) 
 
 Soil erosion is a serious ecological problem troubling the 
farmers. In 1999, the government initiated one of the most 
ambitious conservation programs in the developing world in order 
to prevent soil erosion. (Uchida et al 2004) When completed, the 
program should convert around 14.67 million hectares of cropland, 
4.4 million of which are to be on cultivated land with a slope of at 
least 25 degrees. (World Wildlife Fund 2003) All over China, the 
government pays a subsidy to each family for “returning” their 
hillside allotments to forest—in other words, for not farming it. 
They receive more money for tending the hillside by planting trees 
on it and caring for it.2 The Grain to Green Policy is not voluntary; 
families are bound to return any land that is hilly enough to meet 
the government criteria. For some families in one village in Dayi 
County, this amounted to a family’s total allotment of land. 
(Zhang Mingxia, interviewed by the author, 13 July 2006) This 
policy has been controversial; some families are happy to receive a 
subsidy for not farming their land, while others feel that the 
subsidy cannot replace the amount of food they would produce on 
the returned plot. As one farmer pointed out, “Now all my land is 
returned to the government and we have to buy everything. The 
subsidy from the government is too little and we have to spend 
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money to buy food to survive.” (Huang Hua, interviewed by the 
author, 14 July 2006) The immediate consequence is that the policy 
pushes farmers further into the cash economy. 
  
 Meanwhile, the government is aware of the importance of 
providing micro-credit for households and small businesses in 
rural areas. According to Wu Xiaoling, Deputy Governor of 
Sichuan Province, “First, reform of the rural credit cooperatives 
has been underway smoothly and the number of rural households 
that have access to micro-credits and joint-guaranteed micro-
credits from rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) nationwide reached 
71.34 million as of the end-September, 2005, accounting for 32.31 
percent of the total 220 million rural households.” (Speech, 22 
March 2006) By his estimates, the micro-credit provided by the 
rural credit cooperatives is meeting 60 per cent of the needs of 
China’s 220 million rural households. The 2004 No. 1 document 
specifically called on financial institutions to better serve the rural 
economy by expanding micro-credit services and joint-guaranteed 
loans to farmers. (Wu 2006)  
  
 The No. 1 Documents of 2005 and 2006 further stress the 
need to foster micro-credit services and expand farmer access to 
credit: “The No.1 documents of the central government in [the last] 
three consecutive years all [emphasized] encouraging institutional 
innovation in rural financial system, while in [the most] recent two 
years it clarified that micro-credit should be developed greatly as 
an appropriate financial innovation.” (Wu 2006) Because the 
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inability of households and small enterprises to access credit has 
been a major obstacle to rural entrepreneurship, the government 
hopes increasing its financial and credit services to rural residents 
will improve livelihoods and increase employment opportunities.  
  
Since privatization haltingly began in the 1990s, the ability of 
private companies to establish businesses has reportedly been 
difficult, particularly in rural areas. Some local governments set up 
barriers to small businesses in the form of land use and official 
permits. The central government has taken steps to lower these 
barriers, however, as it recognizes the dwindling potential of TVEs 
(Town and Village Enterprises) and state-owned enterprises to 
offer new employment. “Private firms are expected to be the 
engine of rural economic growth in the future. Although the 
National People’s Congress revised the constitution to ensure 
equal treatment of private enterprises, more needs to be done to 
pull down the many barriers to private sector development that 
exist at the local level….The government should establish clear 
rules of the game and build up rural infrastructure.” (Huang et al 
2004: 57) Agriculture-related firms are already benefiting from the 
new policies: “As the government is going to increase subsidies for 
main grain production areas, agriculture material firms, such as 
Shandong Denghai Seeds Co and Nanjing Redsun Co, will be the 
largest beneficiaries.” Firms that produce construction materials 
and consumption goods for farmers can expect new demand and 
create employment opportunities. (Gov.cn, 24 February 2006)  
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The ability of private businesses to develop new 
employment opportunities may greatly influence the outward 
migration trends and the outcome of the hukou dilemma. It is 
against this background that some cities and provinces have 
relaxed the hukou restrictions considerably. For instance, in Jiangsu 
Province, the differentiation of rural and urban domicile 
registration has been abolished, and the urban and rural residents 
are treated equally. (China Today, April 2004) Some welfare reforms 
have been enacted as well: “In big cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Shenzhen, a considerable number of schools for migrant workers' 
children have opened. Migrant workers in some areas also have 
the legal right to a pension and industrial injury insurance.” (ibid) 
Several interviewees mentioned that it became easier to migrate to 
the cities. Zhang Weishu explained, “The current policies allow all 
the young people to work out. We all like the policies—I quite 
agree that the people should be allowed to work out. If the young 
people are kept home, it is a waste of resources.” (Zhang Weishu, 
interviewed by the author, 11 July 2006) 
 
Despite the official press touting recent reforms, however, 
some studies show that the hukou reforms have made little 
difference to the most vulnerable migrants: “Official Chinese press 
statements portray recent hukou reforms as eliminating 
discrimination in the household registration system.  Instead, these 
reforms have transformed the hukou system from a method of 
restricting change in permanent residence to a barrier preventing 
some of China’s most vulnerable citizens from receiving public 
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services.” (Congressional Executive Commission on China 2005: 1) 
Whether the government has plans to further relax the hukou is still 
a matter of speculation, but the intense efforts to improve the 
welfare of rural residents may be seen as a strategy to reduce the 
need for urban migration. 
  
 The government is finally addressing what is one of the most 
contentious rural issues: land rights. Since the dismantling of the 
commune, land has been legally entrusted to the township, which 
administers it and ensures that every resident has access to land. 
(Oi 1989) The land is divided into residential, farming, and 
development zones, and must occasionally be reconfigured. 
Disputes arise when the reconfiguring of land infringes on the 
rights of users to access land, primarily when developers convince 
officials to lease agricultural land to them for real estate 
development. Land rights infringements have become a serious 
problem since the expansion of cities and the growth of industrial 
and housing developments in peri-urban areas. In these urban 
expansions and peri-urban developments, the newly developed 
land is too often taken from its users without adequate 
compensation. This appropriation is possible because land rights 
do not belong to the individual users, but rather to the township 
and village heads. These local leaders have strong economic 
incentives to sell or lease the land to the wealthy developers. 
Consequently, the land users are often forced out of the land to 
find low-paid non-agricultural work in the city. Of the 87,000 
government-recognized collective protests in China in 2005, many 
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of them addressed the abuses of land rights. (Bloomberg.com, 3 
March 2006)3  
  
 These protests, especially when illicitly photographed and 
captured on video, deal a damaging blow to the government’s 
legitimacy. They reveal the government’s inability to solve the 
land rights problem through the judiciary and its failure to address 
the poor people’s grievances. To handle these protests, which 
increased by 10,000 between 2004 and 2005 alone (Bloomberg.com, 
3 March 2006), the government has resorted to several tactics. First, 
they are clamping down on media coverage of the protests. But 
several protests which turned violent were widely publicized and 
greatly embarrassed the government. The government seems to 
permit such protests to take place as a kind of “pressure valve” so 
that tensions do not escalate into more violent confrontations.  
  
 Second, the government is keen to address some of the root 
causes of the land rights crisis. It publicly acknowledged the 
problem and allowed people to debate the issue. It also punished 
those officials who abused land rights for personal gains 
(China.org, 27 December 2000; The China Daily, 13 July 2005), and 
publicized the new legislations that protected the rights of land 
users. (Gov.cn, 11 May 2006) However, the government did 
nothing to change the local officials’ absolute control over the land, 
the lack of judicial protection of land users’ rights, the illegal 
transactions of land between the officials and developers, and the 
lack of press freedom to report the problems on the ground. While 
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the government has begun to address the land rights issue, it will 
likely remain the most contentious rural issue until the deeper 
issue of property and judicial rights are thoroughly addressed. 
  
Regarding rural social development, the government has 
initiated several complementary programs to improve rural 
education. The most important goal is to offer free compulsory 
education in all rural areas by 2010. “All the rural students 
receiving the nine-year compulsory education (elementary and 
junior secondary education) will be exempted from paying 
miscellaneous as well as tuition fees by 2010, which is a goal we 
put forward in the 11th Five-Year Programme (2006-10)…. Already 
36 million rural students are now benefiting from this policy.” 
(Gov.cn, 11 November 2005, quoting Han Jin, Director of the 
Ministry of Education’s Department of Planning) The new 
development strategies of China, which include developing 
Chinese talent and education, stress the need for improved rural 
education: “[China] will quicken the readjustment of the 
educational structure and institute education aimed at all-round 
development of students, with emphasis being put on compulsory 
education, especially compulsory education in the countryside.” 
(White Paper PDR III 2005)  
  
The government has also encouraged teachers to teach in the 
countryside for several years in the hope that as more qualified 
teachers exchange both knowledge and experience with the 
students and local teachers, education will be improved. The 
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Ministry of Education spokesman Wang Xuming noted that mere 
access to schools would no longer be the main problem in rural 
education, as basic school fees for rural children will be abolished 
in 2007: “Instead, improving the quality of rural education will 
become the focus and is a key to building a new socialist 
countryside.” (The China Daily, 8 March 2006, quoting Wang) 
Graduates who volunteer for the ministry’s rotation program 
could receive a master’s degree after teaching in the countryside 
for four years. This program is not only intended to improve rural 
education, however; it is also a social policy that encourages urban 
residents to acknowledge a social duty to rural populations.  
  
Moreover, improving access to healthcare has become a 
priority for the government as the government acknowledges the 
medical concerns of rural residents. In 2005, the government 
established a new rural cooperative medical system to fund part of 
the farmers’ medical expenses. In June 2006, 1400 counties joined 
the pilot program, which should be available to 80 per cent of 
Chinese counties by the end of 2008. (China View, 11 September 
2006) “With the new policy, a farmer puts 10 yuan (US$1.25) a year 
into his personal medical care account and the government adds 
another 40 yuan (US$5). The government will pay a maximum of 
65 per cent of his medical charges a year.” The total allowance 
provided by the central government in 2006 should reach 4.23 
billion RMB (US$529 million). The government is also planning to 
improve rural healthcare facilities: “By 2010, China will renovate 
22,000 village clinics, 1,300 county-level general hospitals, 400 
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county-level traditional or ethnic hospitals and 950 county-level 
maternity and child-care institutes.” (China View, 11 Sept 2006) 
Finally, the Ministry of Health is establishing a rotational system 
similar to the teaching rotational system, offering incentives to 
urban doctors for rural work. 
  
 The state has since the 1990s been allowing more non-
governmental groups to form, even though it has maintained 
authority over all independent civil society groups. “It is often in 
the interests of the state, local government and organization 
members that greater autonomy is exercised—to deal with issues 
in which the state can no longer afford to be involved, to deal with 
conflict, and to further common interests in developing the local 
economy.” (Plummer et al 2004: 26) International organizations 
such as the Heifer International, the Plan International, as well as 
the Chinese groups like Nongjianu (Rural Women) use their 
connections, expertise and outside funding to improve the welfare 
of rural communities. Rather than seeing the Heifer International 
as a competitor, the government integrates certain Heifer strategies 
such as community focus, wealth and knowledge sharing, and 
equitable development with its agenda of “Establishing the New 
Socialist Countryside.” (See Picture 2)  
  
 In the midst of its rapid economic growth, China’s 
environment has suffered massive deforestation, water and air 
pollution, and depletion of resources. According to Pan Yue, 
China’s Deputy Minister of the Environment, “Our raw materials 
 Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.1 
34 
 
are scarce, we don’t have enough land, and our population is 
constantly growing…Cities are growing, but desert areas are 
expanding at the same time; habitable and usable land has been 
halved over the past 50 years…[China’s GDP miracle] will end 
soon because the environment can no longer keep pace.” (Wen 
2005: 10) The dire situation has prompted the government to begin 
endorsing a “scientific concept of development,” which promotes 
a more efficient use of resources and better protection of the 
environment. (Gov.cn, 13 Mar 2006)  
 
 Hu Jintao’s focus on balanced growth has had the dual 
objectives of protecting the environment and addressing the rural-
urban disparities. At a March 2005 meeting on population and the 
environment, Hu Jintao declared, “China should speed up the 
adjustment of its irrational economic structure and completely 
abandon the 'extensive way' of economic growth. China should 
promote economic growth based on improvement of quality of the 
people, efficient use of resources, environmental pollution 
reduction and the importance attached to quality and economic 
returns for the building of an energy-efficient and environment-
friendly society.” (The People’s Daily, 13 March 2005) The increasing 
emphasis on the environment was apparent in many aspects of our 
interviewees’ lives. The Grain to Green policy, the bio-gas 
subsidies, and the organic and sustainable farming raised public 
awareness of the importance of environmental protection.4  The 
current efforts of the government have reassured many rural 
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residents that the government is reversing the harm inflicted on 
the environment. 
 
 
Do the Rural Development Strategies Represent a 
Reorientation of Reform? 
Given the new and major changes occurring in the countryside, 
should the New Socialist Countryside movement be considered a 
reversal in the government’s development strategy? Or should it 
be seen as no more than a political manoeuvre, however well-
intentioned?  
  
 The current policies of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao represent a 
clear departure from the policies of Mao, Deng and Jiang. Mao, 
while exhibiting great empathy with the peasant as the backbone 
of the revolution (Mao 1951), openly exploited their food 
production and subsistence lifestyle through the collective system. 
Deng lifted millions of rural workers out of poverty by disbanding 
the communes and creating the household responsibility system, 
but his policies benefited the urban areas at the expense of the 
countryside. Jiang’s policies, which established regional targeting 
through the provision of additional funding for the western part of 
China and for the designated poor counties, exclusively targeted 
the worst poverty in the country. By comparison, Hu Jintao’s 
policy is more inclusive than those of his predecessors. It aims at 
evening the urban-rural disparities and accelerating rural 
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development. It represents a paradigm shift from rapid growth at 
any cost towards more balanced economic growth. 
 
The new emphasis on rural development has significant 
implications for China in the twentieth-first century. This strategy 
wins strong support from rural workers, development strategists 
and public media. It affects the level of rural political support for 
the state, the changing patterns of migration, and the people’s 
access to land resources. The elimination of agricultural taxes has 
won the Communist authorities much goodwill from the rural 
population. “Before when there were taxes, maybe some … people 
hated the CCP. Now you get subsidy, and it’s wonderful with no 
tax. Hu Jintao has really reduced our burden and has really helped 
us…This is just like heaven now.” (Zhang Chengbi, interviewed by 
the author, 7 July 2006) “After Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao gained 
power, they really are concerned about us. They try to do some 
good for us and ease our farmers’ burden. They are really good 
people! They are supported by over 90% of the farmers.” (Zhang 
Weishu, interviewed by the author, 11 July 2006) These remarks 
correspond to the positive portrayal of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao 
in the media abroad:  “Hu and Wen's pledge to redirect 
government spending to basic rural services have helped to build 
an image of populist leaders who care about those who have not 
benefited from China's economic growth.” (National Public Radio, 
19 April 2006) The fact that every dynasty in imperial China was 
overthrown by discontented peasants may have played a role in 
changing the development policies. “Mao's successors are 
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determined to give the countryside a belated helping hand, they 
say, if only out of fear of a new peasant uprising.” (BBC News, 
November 2005) Since 2004, frequent outbreaks of rural protests 
have compelled Hu Jintao to adopt radical measures to improve 
his own image and that of the Communist Party. The popular 
support for the state will now depend on the successful 
implementation of his rural development policies. The ultimate 
goal of his policies is to “ease the farmers’ burden” and to improve 
social harmony. An immediate consequence is that a drastically 
improved rural environment will encourage some migrants to 
return home and to work in the local areas, and it may eventually 
reverse the rural-urban migration.  
 
 In my interviews with three returning migrants who 
participated in the Heifer livestock raising programs at their 
villages, they spoke of the good quality of life at home. Their 
income from the Heifer livestock raising programs was about the 
same of what they had earned in the city before. Zhang Anzhong 
returned to Pingqiao Township in Nanbu County from 
construction work in a nearby city to raise pigs through Heifer. “I 
prefer the fresh air of the countryside, and never aspired to life in 
the city. Even though [the construction job] made more money, I 
spent more too. I wanted to come back to start my own business. 
There is nothing to worry about, even if I lose some money.” 
(Zhang Anzhong, interviewed by the author, 7 July 2006)  He is 
now the local veterinarian in his village. Kong Lingying worked in 
a garment factory in Shanghai and returned home to raise rabbits 
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with Heifer in Beiyuan Township, Nanbu County. She worked 
almost as much as she had in Shanghai but she was more 
financially secure and had control over her work schedule. As she 
recalled, “The salary is a little better than the city income and I can 
take care of my kids at home. I am enjoying a more peaceful and 
free (ziyou) life.” (Kong Lingying, interviewed by the author, 10 
July 2006) When Chen Suqiong was in the city, she packaged 
liquor in a factory and transported sand at a construction site. She 
commented on the hardships of being a migrant worker:  
“It is difficult, hard work, and you have to be watched; there 
is no freedom. If you have worked every day as a migrant 
worker then you might get more money than raising rabbits, 
but that is hard—usually it is seasonal work, not every day. It 
is heavy labor and the living expenses are worse [than here]. 
If it is scorching hot you still have to work. But here if it is hot 
I don’t have to go work; I can stay inside and enjoy the 
electric fan. It’s more relaxing here.” (Chen Suqiong, 
interviewed by the author, 14 July 2006)  
 
Their stories reveal that as long as there is a better economic 
environment in rural areas, many migrant workers prefer to live a 
stable life at their home villages rather than enduring all the 
hardships in the cities. Chen Suqiong’s father agreed: “Now many 
people want to come back to the land because of the agricultural 
tax exemption and the government’s subsidy to them for growing 
on the land.” (Chen Suqiong’s father, interviewed by the author, 
10 July 2006)  
 China’s Good Earth 
39 
 
But many interviewees were concerned about their access to 
land resources. On average, most villagers in Nanbu and Dayi 
counties had an allotment of 0.7 mu of land per person.5 When the 
migrant workers returned, there would be a growing pressure on 
the limited land resources in overcrowded villages. As Zhang 
Weishu stated, “This is the situation in my village: all young 
people who are able to go out and work in the city have gone. This 
leaves only the old and babies. This means we have excessive land 
and excessive food. We worry though that when all the young 
people come back we won’t have enough land.” (Zhang Weishu, 
interviewed by the author, 11 July 2006) Zhang Anzhong shared 
the same view: “You just work out with the person who is leaving 
and you negotiate. [The migrant worker] may even ask around 
before leaving because he doesn’t want to abandon the land 
because it is bad for the soil.” (Zhang Anzhong, interviewed by the 
author, 7 July 2006) Where rural labor surpluses don’t exist due to 
high migration, substantially improved rural opportunities may 
again cause tension over agricultural land.  
 
 
Conclusion 
The Chinese government’s determination to “ease the farmer’s 
burden” is a daunting task. But politically, this emphasis on rural 
development is a sensible strategy to address the frequent eruption 
of protests. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao are trying to prove 
themselves as competent as their predecessors Chairman Mao, 
Deng Xiaoping and, to a lesser extent, Jiang Zemin.6 Rural unrest 
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will not serve them well as they are eager to show the world that 
China has become a modernizing and strong world power. From 
an economic perspective, the White Paper for 2006 reveals that 
China’s development strategy is to rely on domestic demand to 
fuel growth. (White Paper 2005 PDR I) A domestic demand-
oriented policy depends on an increasingly prosperous population. 
With up to 900 million farmers, the government’s investment in 
their well-being will eventually lead to the rise of their purchasing 
power. How long will the New Socialist Countryside Movement 
sustain itself? This campaign will continue until rural unrest has 
diminished and more balanced growth is achieved. The Chinese 
government is determined to provide universal free compulsory 
education for all children and access to health care for rural 
populations. When the government finally has lifted millions of 
poor rural families out of poverty, it may alter the hukou 
restrictions without any fear that the peasants may flock to the 
cities.  
 
To conclude, the rural development policies implemented by 
Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao set out to address all the social, 
environmental, economic and political problems caused by Deng’s 
urban-based development strategies. If Hu and Wen succeed in 
accomplishing their goals, China will soon achieve a more 
balanced and sustainable economic growth and become a new 
model for the developing world.  
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Glossary 
 
chengshihua       城市化 
dushihua       都市化 
Guoji Xiaomuniu Xiangmu   国际小母牛项目 
Guowuyuan fupin kaifa lingdao  
xiaozu bangongshi     国务院扶贫开发领导小组办公室 
hukou        户口  
Jianshe shehui zhuyi xin nongcun 建设社会主义新农村 
liudong renkou      流动人口  
mu         畝 
Nongjianu       农家女 
tiliu        提留 
tongchou       统筹 
yuan        元 
Zhongguo nongmin diaocha    中国农民调查  
ziyou        自由 
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Notes 
1 Guowuyuan fupin kaifa lingdao xiaozu bangongshi.  
2 In Qunming Village, Dayi County, for example, the grain to 
green subsidy was 210 yuan/mu, with an extra 20 yuan/ mu for 
tending the hillside. (Zhang Mingxia, interviewed by the author, 
13 July 2006) 
3 The inability of the media to cover these protests means that the 
causes and nature of the protest is not always known. However, 
many protestors have managed to smuggle out photos, videos, or 
descriptions of the protests, and many rurally based protests focus 
on land rights abuses or local authorities’ abuses. (National Public 
Radio, 13 December 2005) 
4 One village in Dayi is experiencing a closure of the local coal 
mine because of the mine owners’ extensive pollution violations. 
The river running through this township in Dayi County was 
entirely black and may never be safe for drinking or even 
swimming. Though the mine employed most of our interviewees, 
the closure was deemed necessary due to its constant harm to the 
environment and regular violations of safety codes. This single 
experience seems to back up the promises in the media that the 
government would crack down on environmental abuses by 
companies.  
5 This allotment was based on family size during the land 
redistribution of 1978-1983. Changes in family size due to birth 
and deaths rarely affected the family’s allotment of land. Several 
families expressed frustration that though they had gained 
daughters-in-law and children/ grandchildren, they had not 
gained any more land. Indeed, several villagers needed their 
children to move to the city so that the family could take over their 
allotment and have enough land to farm. This finding confirms the 
view of Elisabeth Croll that land allocation anomalies resulting 
from marriage, birth, and death was common in Henan Province 
as early as 1987, four years after the end of land redistribution. 
(Croll 1994: 36-94) 
6 Informal conversations during fieldwork revealed that a number 
of Chinese people feel that Jiang Zemin was more concerned with 
the military build-up of the country rather than the everyday 
problems of rural Chinese. Even when expressing avid admiration 
for Hu Jintao, many people spoke with great cynicism about Jiang.  
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Appendices  
 
Figure 1: National Population of Those Rural People Who Have 
Left Their Original Home or Household Registration 
全国按现住地，户口登记地分的人口(乡村) 
合计 本县(市)  
其他乡 
本县(市)  
其他镇 
本县(市)  
其他街道 
本市区 
其他乡 
本市区 
其他镇 
本市区 
其他街道 
本省其他县 (市 ) 
市区 
省外 
Total [Moved to 
a] village in 
original 
county/ 
city 
 
[Moved to 
a] town in 
original 
county/ 
city 
 
[Moved to a] 
street 
committee in 
original 
county/ city 
[Moved 
to a] 
village in 
original 
urban 
district 
[Moved 
to a] 
town in 
original 
urban 
district 
[Moved to 
a] street 
committee 
in original 
urban 
district 
[Moved to a] 
different county 
or urban district 
in original 
province 
[Moved] 
Outside the 
province 
30,949,572 3,844,891 6,004,998 987,504 503,051 676,462 1,032,690 7,091,561 10,808,415 
While almost 11 million of the 2000 rural migrant population had moved 
outside their province, over 13 million rural migrants stayed within their 
county, city, or urban district. 
 
Source: Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the People’s 
Republic of China (中国 2000年人口普查资料), 726. 2002. Compiled 
By Population Census Office (PCO). 
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Figure 2: Growing Intercounty Floating Population of China,
1982-2000
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Source: Liang & Ma, 2004: 471, citing PCO 1985: Table 2, p.559; 
PCO 1993: Table 1-2, p.6; PCO 2002; Table 1-4, p.15; (for 1995) 
Division of Socio- demographics, National Bureau of Statistics. 
 
 
Figure 3: Gini Index (Percentages):
China's Inequality Compared to 10 Other Countries.
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China's level of inequality is surpassed only by notoriously 
unequal countries such as Brazil and Guatemala, which have 
experienced many more centuries of uneven development than 
China.  
 
Sources: Heilig 2006; Data from the World Bank (2005) and the 
China Statistical Yearbook, 2004, Table 3-11. 
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Picture 1: Dayi County Bridge 
This “Bridge” from the main road to Qunming village results in 
deaths during most rainy seasons, when villagers must detour 
several hours to get to the main road or risk a trip through high 
water. Many villagers mentioned their hope to secure funding for 
a bridge as other villages downriver and up-river have obtained.  
 
Photograph by Jessica Wade 
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Picture 2: Integrating NGOs and the Government 
Propaganda. 
This sign in Dayi County reads: “The Badi Grass Exercise [The 
grass known for rapidly spreading over large areas of land]: 
Establishing the New Socialist Countryside: A Heifer International 
Rabbit Raising Project.”   
 
Photograph by Jessica Wade 
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Interviews in Nanbu and Dayi Counties in Sichuan Province 
Chen Suqiong (陈素琼), 44-year-old female living in Tuanshang 
Village, Xieyuan Township, Dayi County. Rabbit raiser with 
Heifer. Interviewed by the author on 14 July 2006.  
Huang Hua (黄华), 26-year-old female living in Qunming Village, 
Xieyuan Township, Dayi County. Rabbit raiser with Heifer. 
Interviewed by the author on 14 July 2006.  
Kong Lingying (孔令英), 35-year-old female living in Beiyuan 
Township, Nanbu County. Rabbit raiser with Heifer. 
Interviewed by the author on 10 July 2006. 
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Long Baojun (龙 宝 君 ), mid-30s male, Animal Husbandry 
Technician, Nanbu County Animal Husbandry Bureau. 
Interviewed by the author on 8 July 2006. 
Tang Mibu (唐密布), 24-year-old female living in Qunming Village, 
Xieyuan Township, Nanbu County. Rabbit raiser with Heifer. 
Interviewed by the author on 14 July 2006.  
Xu Quanjian (徐全健), mid-50s male, Director, Nanbu County 
Animal Husbandry Bureau. Heifer project implementer, 
Nanbu County. Interviewed by the author on 9 July 2006. 
Zhang Anzhong (张安忠), 24-year-old male living in Pingqiao 
Township, Nanbu County. Pig-breeder and trainee with 
Heifer for local veterinarian. Interviewed by the author on 7 
July 2006. 
Zhang Chengbi (张成壁), 60-year-old female living in Pingqiao 
Township, Nanbu County. Farmer and pig-breeder. 
Interviewed by the author on 7 July 2006. 
Zhang Mingxia (张明霞), 34-year-old female living in Qunming 
Village, Xieyuan Township, Dayi County. Farmer, 
rabbit-raiser, group leader (Group 12, Qunming Village), and 
community representative for Heifer International. 
Interviewed by the author on 13 July 2006. 
Zhang Weishu (张维树 ), mid-60s male living in Pingqiao 
Township, Nanbu County. Farmer and pig-breeder. 
Interviewed by the author on 11 July 2006. 
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